We present a combination of raising, explicit variable dependency representation, the liberalized δ-rule, and preservation of solutions for first-order deductive theorem proving. Our main motivation is to provide the foundation for our work on inductive theorem proving.
Introduction
The paper organizes as follows: After explaining the technical terms of the title in § 1 and the remaining basic notions in § 2, we start to explicate the differences between our two versions of calculi in § 3. The weak version is explained in § 4. The changes necessary for the strong version in order to admit liberalization of the δ-rule are explained in § 5. After concluding in § 6 we append all the proofs, references, and notes.
Without Skolemization
In this paper we discuss how to analytically prove first-order theorems in contexts where Skolemization is not appropriate. Skolemization has at least three problematic aspects.
1. Skolemization enrichs the signature or introduces higher-order variables. Unless special care is taken, this may introduce objects into empty universes and change the notion of term-generatedness or Herbrand models. Above that, the Skolem functions occur in answers to goals or solutions of constraints 1 which in general cannot be translated into the original signature. For a detailed discussion of these problems cf. Miller (1992) .
Skolemization results in the following simplified quantification structure:
For all Skolem functions u there are solutions to the free γ-variables e (i.e. the free variables of Fitting (1996) ) such that the quantifier-free theorem T ( e, u) is valid. Short:
∀ u. ∃ e. T ( e, u).
Since the state of a proof attempt is often represented as the conjunction of the branches of a tree (e.g. in sequent or (dual) tableau calculi), the free γ-variables become "rigid" or "global", i.e. a solution for a free γ-variable must solve all occurrences of this variable in the whole proof tree. This is because, for B 0 , . . . , B n denoting the branches of the proof tree,
is logically strictly stronger than ∀ u. ( ∃ e. B 0 ∧ . . . ∧ ∃ e. B n ).
Moreover, with this quantification structure it does not seem to be possible to do inductive theorem proving by finding, for each assumed counterexample, another counterexample that is strictly smaller in some wellfounded ordering. 2 The reason for this is the following. When we have some counterexample u for T ( e, u) (i.e. there is no e such that T ( e, u) is valid) then for different e different branches B i in the proof tree may cause the invalidity of the conjunction. If we have applied induction hypotheses in more than one branch, for different e we get different smaller counterexamples. What we would need, however, is one single smaller counterexample for all e.
3. Skolemization increases the size of the formulas. (Note that in most calculi the only relevant part of Skolem terms is the top symbol and the set of occurring variables.)
The first and second problematic aspects disappear when one uses raising (cf. Miller (1992) ) instead of Skolemization. Raising is a dual of Skolemization and simplifies the quantification structure to something like:
There are raising functions e such that for all possible values of the free δ-variables u (i.e. the nullary constants or "parameters") the quantifier-free theorem T ( e, u) is valid. Short: ∃ e. ∀ u. T ( e, u).
Note that due to the two duality switches "unsatisfiability/validity" and "Skolemization/ raising", in this paper raising will look much like Skolemization in refutational theorem proving. The inverted order of universal and existential quantification of raising (compared to Skolemization) is advantageous because now
is indeed logically equivalent to ∃ e. ( ∀ u. B 0 ∧ . . . ∧ ∀ u. B n ).
Furthermore, inductive theorem proving works well: When, for some e, we have some counterexample u for T ( e, u) (i.e. T ( e, u) is invalid) then one branch B i in the proof tree must cause the invalidity of the conjunction. If this branch is closed, then it contains the application of an induction hypothesis that is invalid for this e and the u ′ resulting from the instantiation of the hypothesis. Thus, u ′ together with the induction hypothesis provides the strictly smaller counterexample we are searching for for this e.
The third problematic aspect disappears when the dependency of variables is explicitly represented in a variable-condition, cf. Kohlhase (1995) . This idea actually has a long history, cf. Prawitz (1960) , Kanger (1963) , Bibel (1987) . Moreover, the use of variable-conditions admits the free existential variables to be first-order.
Sequent and Tableau Calculi
In Smullyan (1968) , rules for analytic theorem proving are classified as α-, β-, γ-, and δ-rules independently from a concrete calculus.
α-rules describe the simple and the β-rules the case-splitting propositional proof steps.
γ-rules show existential properties, either by exhibiting a term witnessing to the existence or else by introducing a special kind of variable, called "dummy" in Prawitz (1960) and Kanger (1963) , and "free variable" in footnote 11 of Prawitz (1960) and in Fitting (1996) . We will call these variables free γ-variables. By the use of free γ-variables we can delay the choice of a witnessing term until the state of the proof attempt gives us more information which choice is likely to result in a successful proof. It is the important addition of free γ-variables that makes the major difference between the free variable calculi of Fitting (1996) and the calculi of Smullyan (1968) . Since there use to be infinitely many possibly witnessing terms (and different branches may need different ones), the γ-rules (under assistance of the β-rules) often destroy the possibility to decide validity because they enable infinitely many γ-rule applications to the same formula.
δ-rules show universal properties simply with the help of a new symbol, called a "parameter", about which nothing is known. Since the present free γ-variables must not be instantiated with this new parameter, in the standard framework of Skolemization and unification the parameter is given the present free γ-variables as arguments. In this paper, however, we will use nullary parameters, which we call free δ-variables. These variables are not free in the sense that they may be chosen freely, but in the sense that they are not bound by any quantifier. Our free δ-variables are similar to the parameters of Kanger (1963) because a free γ-variable may not be instantiated with all of them. We will store the information on the dependency between free γ-variables and free δ-variables in variable-conditions.
Preservation of Solutions
Users even of pure Prolog are not so much interested in theorem proving as they are in answer computation. The theorem they want to prove usually contains some free existential variables that are instantiated during a proof attempt. When the proof attempt is successful, not only the input theorem is known to be valid but also the instance of the theorem with the substitution built-up during the proof. Since the knowledge of mere existence is much less useful than the knowledge of a term that witnesses to this existence (unless this term is a only free existential variable), theorem proving should-if possible-always provide these witnessing terms. Answer computation is no problem in Prolog's Horn logic because it is so simple. But also for the more difficult clausal logic, answer computation is possible. Cf. e.g. Baumgartner &al. (1997) , where tableau calculi are used for answer computation in clausal logic. Answer computation becomes even harder when we consider full first-order logic instead of clausal logic. When δ-steps occur in a proof, the introduced free universal variables may provide no information on what kind of object they denote. Their excuse may be that they cannot do this in terms of computability or λ-terms. Nevertheless, they can provide this information in form of Hilbert's ε-terms, and the strong versions of our calculi will do so. When full first-order logic is considered, one should focus on preservation of solutions instead of computing answers. By this we mean at least the following property:
All solutions that transform a proof attempt for a proposition into a closed proof (i.e. the closing substitutions for the free γ-variables) are also solutions of the original proposition.
This again is closely related to inductive theorem proving: Suppose that we finally have shown that for the reduced form R( e, u) (i.e. the state of the proof attempt) of the original theorem T ( e, u) (cf. the discussion in § 1.1), there is some solution e such that for each counterexample u of R( e, u) there is a counterexample u ′ for the original theorem and that this u ′ is strictly smaller than u in some wellfounded ordering. In this case we have proved T ( e, u) only if the solution e for the reduced form ∀ u. R( e, u) is also a solution for the original theorem ∀ u. T ( e, u).
The Liberalized δ-rule
We use '⊎' for the union of disjoint classes and 'id' for the identity function. For a class R we define domain, range, and restriction to and image 3 and reverse-image of a class A by
We define a sequent to be a list of formulas. 4 The conjugate of a formula A (written: A ) is the formula B if A is of the form ¬B, and the formula ¬A otherwise. Note that the conjugate of the conjugate of a formula is the original formula again, unless it has the form ¬¬B.
In the tradition of Gentzen (1935) we assume the symbols for free γ-variables (i.e. the free variables of Fitting (1996) ), free δ-variables (i.e. nullary parameters), bound variables (i.e. variables for quantified use only), and the constants (i.e. the function (and predicate) symbols from the signature) to come from four disjoint sets V γ , V δ , V bound , and Σ. We assume each of V γ , V δ , V bound to be infinite (for each sort) and set V free := V γ ⊎V δ . Moreover, due to the possibility to rename bound variables w.l.o.g., we do not permit quantification on variables that occur already bound in a formula; i.e. e.g. ∀x: A is only a formula in our sense if A does not contain a quantifier on x like ∀x or ∃x. The simple effect is that our γ-and δ-rules can simply replace all occurrences of x. For a term, formula, sequent Γ &c., 'V γ (Γ )', 'V δ (Γ )', 'V bound (Γ )', 'V free (Γ )' denote the sets of variables from V γ , V δ , V bound , V free occurring in Γ , resp.. For a substitution σ we denote with 'Γ σ' the result of replacing in Γ each variable x in dom(σ) with σ(x). Unless stated otherwise, we tacitly assume that each substitution σ satisfies V bound (dom(σ) ∪ ran(σ)) = ∅, such that no bound variables can be replaced and no additional variables become bound (i.e. captured) when applying σ.
, so that we must not instantiate the free γ-variable x γ with a term containing y δ .
While the benefit of the introduction of free γ-variables in γ-rules is to delay the choice of a witnessing term, it is sometimes unsound to instantiate such a free γ-variable x γ with a term containing a free δ-variable y δ that was introduced later than x γ :
is not deductively valid. We can start a proof attempt via: γ-step:
Now, if we were allowed to substitute the free γ-variable x γ with the free δ-variable y δ , we would get the tautology (y δ = y δ ), i.e. we would have proved an invalid formula. In order to prevent this, the δ-step has to record (x γ , y δ ) in the variable-condition, which disallows the instantiation step.
In order to restrict the possible instantiations as little as possible, we should keep our variableconditions as small as possible. Kanger (1963) and Bibel (1987) are quite generous in that they let their variable-conditions become quite big:
∃x. P(x) ∨ ∀y. ¬P(y) can be proved the following way: γ-step:
P(x γ ) ∨ ∀y. ¬P(y) . α-step:
P(x γ ), ∀y. ¬P(y). δ-step:
The last step is not allowed in the above citations, so that another γ-step must be applied to the original formula in order to prove it. Our instantiation step, however, is perfectly sound: Since x γ does not occur in ∀y. ¬P(y), the free variables x γ and y δ do not depend on each other and there is no reason to insist on x γ being older than y δ . Note that moving-in the existential quantifier transforms the original formula into the logically equivalent formula ∃x. P(x) ∨ ∀y. ¬P(y), which (after a preceding α-step) enables the δ-step introducing y δ to come before the γ-step introducing x γ .
Keeping small the variable-conditions generated by the δ-rule results in non-elementary reduction of the size of smallest proofs. This "liberalization of the δ-rule" has a history ranging from Smullyan (1968) over Hähnle & Schmitt (1994) to Baaz & Fermüller (1995) . While the liberalized δ-rule of Smullyan (1968) is already able to prove the formula of Example 1.2 with a single γ-step, it is much more restrictive than the more liberalized δ-rule of Baaz & Fermüller (1995) .
Note that liberalization of the δ-rule is not simple because it easily results in unsound calculi, cf. Kohlhase (1995) is not deductively valid (to wit, let Q be the identity relation on a non-trivial universe).
Consider the following proof attempt: One α-, two γ-, and two liberalized δ-steps result in
with variable-condition
(Note that the non-liberalized δ-rule would additionally have produced ( Note that in the standard framework of Skolemization and unification, this new variable-condition is automatically generated by the occur-check of unification: When we instantiate
which cannot be reduced to a tautology because y
) and u γ cannot be unified.
When we instantiate the variables x γ and u γ in the sequence ( * ) in parallel via
we have to check whether the newly imposed variable-conditions are consistent with the substitution itself. In particular, a cycle as given (for the R of (#)) by
Although this sounds fairly difficult, the formal treatment is quite simple.
Basic Notions, Notations, and Assumptions
We make use of "[. . . ]" for stating two definitions, lemmas, or theorems (and their proofs &c.) in one, where the parts between '[' and ']' are optional and are meant to be all included or all omitted. 'N' denotes the set of and '≺' the ordering on natural numbers. We define N + := { n ∈ N | 0 = n }.
Let 'R' denote a binary relation. R is said to be a relation on
Simply speaking of a reflexive relation we refer to the biggest A that is appropriate in the local context, and referring to this A we write R 0 to ambiguously denote A¸i d. Furthermore, we write R 1 to denote R. For n ∈ N + we write R n+1 to denote R n •R, such that R n denotes the n step relation for R. The transitive closure of R is
Furthermore, we use '∅' to denote the empty set as well as the empty function or empty word. By an (irreflexive) ordering '<' (on A) we mean an irreflexive and transitive binary relation (on A), sometimes called "strict partial ordering" &c. by other authors. A reflexive ordering '≤' on A is an A-reflexive, antisymmetric, and transitive relation on A. The reflexive ordering on A of an ordering < is (< ∪ id) ∩ (A×A). An ordering < is called wellfounded if > is terminating; where, as with all our asymmetric relation symbols, > := < −1 . The class of total functions from A to B is denoted with A → B. The class of (possibly) partial functions from A to B is denoted with A B.
Validity is expected to be given with respect to some Σ-structure (Σ-algebra) A, assigning a universe (to each sort) and an appropriate function to each symbol in Σ. For X ⊆ V free we denote the set of total A-valuations of X (i.e. functions mapping free variables to objects of the universe of A (respecting sorts)) with X → A and the set of (possibly) partial A-valuations of X with X A. For π ∈ X → A we denote with 'A⊎π' the extension of A to the variables of X which are then treated as nullary constants. More precisely, we assume the existence of some evaluation function 'eval' such that eval(A⊎π) maps any term over Σ⊎X into the universe of A (respecting sorts) such that for all x ∈ X: eval(A⊎π)(x) = π(x). Moreover, eval(A⊎π) maps any formula B over Σ⊎X to TRUE or FALSE, such that B is valid in A⊎π iff eval(A⊎π)(B) = TRUE. We assume that the Substitution-Lemma holds in the sense that, for any substitution σ, Σ-structure A, and valuation π ∈ V free → A, validity of a formula B in A⊎((σ ⊎ V free \dom(σ)¸i d) • eval(A⊎π)) is logically equivalent to validity of Bσ in A⊎π. Finally, we assume that the value of the evaluation function on a term or formula B does not depend on the free variables that do not occur in B: eval(A⊎π)(B) = eval(A ⊎ V free (B)¸π )(B). Further properties of validity or evaluation are definitely not needed.
Two Versions of Variable-Conditions
In this section we formally describe two possible choices for the formal treatment of variable-conditions. The weak version works well with the non-liberalized δ-rule. The strong version is a little more difficult but can be used for the liberalized versions of the δ-rule. The presented material is rather formal, but this cannot be avoided and the following sections will be less difficult then.
Several binary relations on free variables will be introduced. The overall idea is that when (x, y) occurs in such a relation this means something like "x is older than y" or "the value of y depends on or is described in terms of x".
For a substitution σ with dom(σ) = V γ we define the existential relation to be
and the universal relation to be
Definition 3.2 ([Strong] Existential R-Substitution)
Let R be a variable-condition. σ is an existential R-substitution if σ is a substitution with dom(σ) = V γ for which U σ • R is irreflexive. σ is a strong existential R-substitution if σ is a substitution with dom(σ) = V γ for which (U σ • R) + is a wellfounded ordering.
Note that, regarding syntax, (x γ , y δ ) ∈ R is intended to mean that an existential R-substitution σ may not replace x γ with a term in which y δ occurs, i.e. (y δ , x γ ) ∈ U σ must be disallowed, i.e. U σ •R must be irreflexive. Thus, the definition of a (weak) existential R-substitution is quite straightforward. The definition of a strong existential R-substitution requires an additional transitive closure because the strong version then admits a smaller R. To see this, take from Example 1.3 the variable-condition R of (#) and the σ of ($). As explained there, σ must not be a strong existential R-substitution due to the cycle y δ U σ u γ R v δ U σ x γ R y δ which just contradicts the irreflexivity of (U σ •R)
2 . Note that in practice w.l.o.g. U σ and R can always be chosen to be finite, so that irreflexivity of (U σ •R)
+ is then equivalent to (U σ •R) + being a wellfounded ordering.
After application of a [strong] existential R-substitution σ, in case of (x γ , y δ ) ∈ R, we have to ensure that x γ is not replaced with y δ via a future application of another [strong] existential Rsubstitution that replaces a free γ-variable u γ occurring in σ(x γ ) with y δ . In this case, the new variable-condition has to contain (u γ , y δ ). This means that E σ •R must be a subset of the updated variable-condition. For the weak version this is already enough. For the strong version we have to add an arbitrary number of steps with U σ •R again.
Definition 3.3 ([Strong] σ-Update)
Let R be a variable-condition and σ be an [strong] existential R-substitution.
Example 3.4
In the proof attempt of Example 1.3 we applied the strong existential R-substitution
Let A be some Σ-structure. We now define a semantic counterpart of our existential R-substitutions, which we will call "existential (A, R)-valuation". Suppose that e maps each free γ-variable not directly to an object of A (of the same sort), but can additionally read the values of some free δ-variables under an A-valuation π ∈ V δ → A, i.e. e gets some π ′ ∈ V δ A with π ′ ⊆π as a second argument; short: e : V γ → ((V δ A) → A). Moreover, for each free γ-variable x, we require the set of read free δ-variables (i.e. dom(π ′ )) to be identical for all π; i.e. there has to be some "semantic relation" S e ⊆ V δ ×V γ such that for all x ∈ V γ : e(x) : (S e {x} → A) → A.
Note that, for each e, at most one semantic relation exists, namely
Let R be a variable-condition, A a Σ-structure, and e :
The semantic relation of e is S e := { (y,
+ is a wellfounded ordering and, for all x ∈ V γ , e(x) : (S e {x} → A) → A.
Finally, for applying [strong] existential (A, R)-valuations in a uniform manner, we define the function
ǫ(e)(π)(x) := e(x)( Se {x} ¸π).
Lemma 3.6
Let R be a variable-condition.
Let σ be a [strong] existential R-substitution and R
′ the [strong] σ-update of R. For each [strong] existential (A, R ′ )-valuation e ′ there is some [strong] existential (A, R)-valuation e such that for all π ∈ V δ → A: ǫ(e)(π) = σ • eval(A ⊎ ǫ(e ′ )(π) ⊎ π).
The Weak Version
We are now going to define R-validity of a set of sequents with free variables, in terms of validity of a formula (where the free variables are treated as nullary constants).
Definition 4.1 (Validity)
Let R be a variable-condition, A a Σ-structure, and G a set of sequents.
A sequent Γ is valid in A if there is some formula listed in Γ that is valid in A.
Validity in a class of Σ-structures is understood as validity in each of the Σ-structures of that class.
If we omit the reference to a special Σ-structure we mean validity (or reduction, cf. below) in some fixed class K of Σ-structures, e.g. the class of all Σ-structures (Σ-algebras) or the class of Herbrand Σ-structures (term-generated Σ-algebras), cf. Wirth& Gramlich (1994) for more interesting classes for establishing inductive validities.
Lemma 4.2 (Anti-Monotonicity of Validity in R)
Let G be a set of sequents and R and R ′ variable-conditions with
Example 4.3 (Validity)
For
. This means that ∅-validity of x γ =y δ is the same as validity of ∀y. ∃x. x=y. Moreover, note that ǫ(e)(π) has access to the π-value of y δ just as a raising function f for x in the raised (i.e. dually Skolemized) version f (y δ )=y δ of ∀y. ∃x. x=y.
Contrary to this, for R := V γ ×V δ , the same formula x γ =y δ is not R-valid in general because then the required irreflexivity of S e •R implies S e = ∅, and e(x γ )(
anymore. This means that (V γ ×V δ )-validity of x γ =y δ is the same as validity of ∃x. ∀y. x=y. Moreover, note that ǫ(e)(π) has no access to the π-value of y δ just as a raising function c for x in the raised version c=y δ of ∃x. ∀y. x=y.
For a more general example let
where for i ∈ I and j ≺ n i the A i,j are formulas with free γ-variables from x and free δ-variables from y.
Besides the notion of validity we need the notion of reduction. Roughly speaking, a set G 0 of sequents reduces to a set G 1 of sequents if validity of G 1 implies validity of G 0 . This, however, is too weak for our purposes here because we are not only interested in validity but also in preserving the solutions for the free γ-variables: For inductive theorem proving, answer computation, and constraint solving it becomes important that the solutions of G 1 are also solutions of G 0 .
Definition 4.4 (Reduction)
G 0 R-reduces to G 1 in A if for all existential (A, R)-valuations e: if G 1 is (e, A)-valid then G 0 is (e, A)-valid, too.
Lemma 4.5 (Reduction)
Let R, R ′ be variable-conditions; A a Σ-structure; G 0 , G 1 , G 2 , and G 3 sets of sequents. Now:
(Monotonicity in R)
In case of
(Instantiation)
For an existential R-substitution σ, and R ′ the σ-update of R:
Now we are going to abstractly describe deductive sequent and tableau calculi. We will later show that the usual deductive first-order calculi are instances of our abstract calculi. The benefit of the abstract version is that every instance is automatically sound. Due to the small number of inference rules in deductive first-order calculi and the locality of soundness, this abstract version is not really necessary. For inductive calculi, however, due to a bigger number of inference rules (which usually have to be improved now and then) and the globality of soundness, such an abstract version is very helpful, cf. Wirth & Becker (1995) , Wirth (1997) .
Definition 4.6 (Proof Forest)
A (deductive) proof forest in a sequent (or else: tableau) calculus is a pair (F, R) where R is a variable-condition and F is a set of pairs (Γ, t), where Γ is a sequent and t is a tree 6 whose nodes are labeled with sequents (or else: formulas).
Note that the tree t is intended to represent a proof attempt for Γ . The nodes of t are labeled with formulas in case of a tableau calculus and with sequents in case of a sequent calculus. While the sequents at the nodes of a tree in a sequent calculus stand for themselves, in a tableau calculus all the ancestors have to be included to make up a sequent and, moreover, the formulas at the labels are in negated form:
Definition 4.7 (Goals(), AX , Closedness)
'Goals(T )' denotes the set of sequents labeling the leaves of the trees in the set T (or else: the set of sequents resulting from listing the conjugates of the formulas labeling a branch from a leaf to the root in a tree in T ).
In what follows, we assume AX to be some set of axioms. By this we mean that AX is V γ ×V δ -valid. (Cf. the last sentence in Definition 4.1.)
The tree t is closed if Goals({t}) ⊆ AX .
The readers may ask themselves why we consider a proof forest instead of a single proof tree only. The possibility to have an empty proof forest provides a nicer starting point. Besides that, if we have trees (Γ, t), (Γ ′ , t ′ ) ∈ F we can apply Γ as a lemma in the tree t ′ of Γ ′ , provided that the lemma application relation is acyclic. For deductive theorem proving the availability of lemma application is not really necessary. For inductive theorem proving, however, lemma and induction hypothesis application of this form becomes necessary.
Definition 4.8 (Invariant Condition)
The invariant condition on (F, R) is that {Γ } R-reduces to Goals({t}) for all (Γ, t) ∈ F .
Theorem 4.9
Let the proof forest (F, R) satisfy the above invariant condition. Let (Γ, t) ∈ F. If t is closed, then Γ is R-valid.
Theorem 4.10
The above invariant condition is always satisfied when we start with an empty proof forest (F, R) := (∅, ∅) and then iterate only the following kinds of modifications of (F, R) (resulting in (F ′ , R ′ )): Instantiation: Let σ be an existential R-substitution. Let R ′ be the σ-update of R. Then we may set F ′ := F σ.
While Hypothesizing and Instantiation steps are self-explanatory, Expansion steps are parameterized by a sequent ∆ and a set of sequents G such that {∆} R ′ -reduces to G. For tableau calculi, however, this set of sequents must actually have the form { Λ∆ | Λ ∈ G } because an Expansion step cannot remove formulas from ancestor nodes. This is because these formulas are also part of the goals associated with other leaves in the proof tree. Therefore, although tableau calculi may save repetition of formulas, sequent calculi have substantial advantages: Rewriting of formulas in place is always possible, and we can remove formulas that are redundant w.r.t. the other formulas in a sequent. But this is not our subject here. For the below examples of α-, β-, γ-, and δ-rules we will use the sequent calculi presentation because it is a little more explicit. When we write ∆ Π 0 . . . Π n−1 R ′′ we want to denote a sub-rule of the Expansion rule which is given by G := {Π 0 , . . . , Π n−1 } and R ′ := R ∪ R ′′ . This means that for this rule really being a sub-rule of the Expansion rule we have to show that {∆} R ′ -reduces to G. By Lemma 4.5(5) and because R does not matter here, it suffices that we actually show that {∆} R ′′ -reduces to G. Moreover, note that in old times when trees grew upwards, Gerhard Gentzen would have written Π 0 . . . Π n−1 above the line and ∆ below, such that passing the line meant implication. In our case, passing the line means reduction.
Let A and B be formulas, Γ and Π sequents,
The above examples of α-, β-, γ-, and δ-rules are all sub-rules of the Expansion rule of the sequent calculus of Theorem 4.10.
The Strong Version
The additional solutions (or existential substitutions) of the strong version (which admit additional proofs compared to the weak version) do not add much difficulty when one is interested in validity only, cf. e.g. Hähnle & Schmitt (1994) . When also the preservation of solutions is required, however, the additional substitutions pose some problems because the new solutions may tear some free δ-variables out of their contexts:
In Example 1.2 a liberalized δ-step reduced
with empty variable-condition R := ∅.
The latter sequent is (e, A)-valid for the strong existential (A, R)-valuation e given by e(x γ )(π) := π(y δ ).
The former sequent, however, is not (e, A)-valid when P A (a) is true and P A (b) is false for some a, b from the universe of A. To see this, take some π with π(y
How can we solve the problem exhibited in Example 5.1? I.e. how can we change the notion of reduction such that the liberalized δ-step becomes a reduction step?
1. The approach we tried first was to allow a slight modification of e to e ′ such that e ′ (x γ )(π) = a. This trial finally failed because it was not possible to preserve reduction under Instantiation-steps. E.g., an Instantiation-step with the strong existential R-substitution {x γ →y δ } transforms the reduction of Example 5.1 into the reduction of
Taking π, e, and A as in Example 5.1, the new latter sequent is still (e, A)-valid. There is, however, no modification e ′ of e such that the new former sequent is (π, e ′ , A)-valid.
Thus, with this approach, reduction could not be preserved by Instantiation-steps.
Moreover, the modification of e does not go together well with our requirement of preservation of solutions.
2. Learning from this, the second approach we tried was to allow a slight modification of π instead. E.g., for the reduction step of Example 5.1, we would require the existence of some η ∈ {y δ } → A such that the former sequent is ( V δ \{y δ }¸π ⊎η, e, A)-valid instead of (π, e, A)-valid. Choosing η := {y δ →a} would solve the problem of Example 5.1 then: Indeed, the former sequent is ( V δ \{y δ }¸π ⊎η, e, A)-valid because for the e of Example 5.1 we have e(x γ )( V δ \{y δ }¸π ⊎η) = ( V δ \{y δ }¸π ⊎η)(y δ ) = a.
Moreover, with this approach, reduction is preserved under Instantiation-steps.
The problems with this approach arise, however, when one asks whether there has to be a single η for all π or, for each π, a different η.
If we require a single η, we cannot model liberalized δ-steps where another free δ-variable, say z δ , occurs in the principal formula, as, e.g., in the reduction of If, on the other hand, we admit a different η for each π, the transitivity of reduction (cf. Lemma 4.5(3) ) gets lost.
Thus, the only solution can be that η depends on some values of π and not on others. Since the abstract treatment of this gets very ugly and does not extract much information on the solution of free γ-variables of the original theorem from a completed proof, we prefer to remember what role the free δ-variables introduced by liberalized δ-steps really play. And this is what the following definition is about.
Definition 5.2 (Choice-Condition, Extension)
C is a (R, <)-choice-condition if C is a (possibly) partial function from V δ into the set of formulas, R is a variable-condition, < is a wellfounded ordering on V δ with (R • <) ⊆ R, and, for all y δ ∈ dom(C):
Note that ∅ is a (R, ∅)-choice-condition for any variable-condition R. For the meaning of choiceconditions cf. Definition 5.6.
Definition 5.3 (Extended Strong σ-Update)
Let C be a (R, <)-choice-condition and σ a strong existential R-substitution.
The extended strong σ-update (C ′ , R ′ , < ′ ) of (C, R, <) is given by
Lemma 5 
Lemma 5.5 (Extended Strong σ-Update)
Let C be a (R, <)-choice-condition, σ a strong existential R-substitution, and (C ′ , R ′ , < ′ ) the extended strong σ-update of (C, R, <). Now:
Definition 5.6 (Compatibility)
Let C be a (R, <)-choice-condition, A a Σ-structure, and e a strong existential (A, R)-valuation. We say that π is (e, A)-compatible with C if π ∈ V δ → A and for each y δ ∈ dom(C): We are now going to proceed like in the previous section, but using the strong versions instead of the weak ones.
Definition 5.7 (Strong Validity)
Let C be a (R, <)-choice-condition, A a Σ-structure, and G a set of sequents.
G is C-strongly R-valid in A if there is a strong existential (A, R)-valuation e such that G is C-strongly (e, A)-valid.
G is C-strongly (e, A)-valid if G is (π, e, A)-valid for each π that is (e, A)-compatible with C.
The rest is given by Definition 4.1.
Lemma 5.8 (Anti-Monotonicity in R and Monotonicity in C)
Let G be a set of sequents, C a (R, <)-choice-condition, and
Example 5.9 (Strong Validity)
Note that ∅-validity does not differ from ∅-strong ∅-validity and that V γ ×V δ -validity does not differ from ∅-strong V γ ×V δ -validity. This is because the notions of weak and strong existential valuations do not differ in these cases. Therefore, Example 4.3 is also an example for strong validity.
Although ∅-strong R-validity always implies (weak) R-validity (because each strong existential (A, R)-valuation is a (weak) existential (A, R)-valuation), for R not being one of the extremes ∅ and V γ ×V δ , (weak) R-validity and ∅-strong R-validity differ from each other. E.g. the sequent ( * ) in Example 1.3 is (weakly) R-valid but not ∅-strongly R-valid for the R of (#):
)}, which is irreflexive. Since the sequent ( * ) is (e, A)-valid for the (weak) existential (A, R)-valuation e given by e(x γ )(
2 is not irreflexive, so that this e is no strong existential (A, R)-valuation, which means that the sequent ( * ) cannot be ∅-strongly R-valid in general.
For nonempty C, however, we must admit that C-strong R-validity is hard to understand. We have to make sure that C-strong R-validity can be easily understood in terms of ∅-strong R ′ -validity for some R ′ , which again implies (weak) R ′ -validity and ∅-validity. Note that this difficulty did not arise in the weak version because Lemma 4.2 states anti-monotonicity of (weak) R-validity in R, whereas Lemma 5.8 states anti-monotonicity of C-strong R-validity in R but only monotonicity of C-strong R-validity in C.
Lemma 5.10 (Compatibility and Validity)
Let A be a Σ-structure, C a (R, <)-choice-condition, and e a strong existential (A, R)-valuation. Define ⊳ := (S e ∪ R ∪ <) + .
⊳ is a wellfounded ordering on
V free .
There is a function
ξ : (V δ \dom(C)) → A → dom(C) → A such that, for all π, π ′ ∈ (V δ \dom(C)) → A, π ⊎ ξ π is (e, A)-compatible with C, and, for x ∈ dom(C), ⊳ {x} ¸π = ⊳ {x} ¸π ′ implies ξ π (x) = ξ π ′ (x).
Let G be a set of sequents and ς
where is the reflexive ordering on V δ of ⊳.
Definition 5.11 (Strong Reduction)
Let C be a (R, <)-choice-condition, A a Σ-structure, and G 0 , G 1 sets of sequents.
G 0 strongly (R, C)-reduces to G 1 in A if for each strong existential (A, R)-valuation e and each π that is (e, A)-compatible with C:
Lemma 5.12 (Strong Reduction)
Let C be a (R, <)-choice-condition; A a Σ-structure; G 0 , G 1 , G 2 , and G 3 sets of sequents. Now:
(Validity)
Assume that G 0 strongly (R, C)-reduces to G 1 in A. Now:
(Reflexivity)
(Transitivity)
If G 0 strongly (R, C)-reduces to G 1 in A and G 1 strongly (R, C)-reduces to G 2 in A, then G 0 strongly (R, C)-reduces to G 2 in A.
(Additivity)
If G 0 strongly (R, C)-reduces to G 2 in A and G 1 strongly (R, C)-reduces to G 3 in A, then G 0 ∪G 1 strongly (R, C)-reduces to G 2 ∪G 3 in A.
(Monotonicity)
For (C ′ , R ′ , < ′ ) being an extension of (C, R, <):
(Instantiation)
For a strong existential R-substitution σ, and the extended strong σ-update (C ′ , R ′ , < ′ ) of (C, R, <):
Now we are going to abstractly describe deductive sequent and tableau calculi. We will later show that the usual deductive first-order calculi are instances of our abstract calculi.
Definition 5.13 (Strong Proof Forest)
A strong (deductive) proof forest in a sequent (or else: tableau) calculus is a quadruple (F, C, R, < ) where C is a (R, <)-choice-condition and F is a set of pairs (Γ, t), where Γ is a sequent and t is a tree whose nodes are labeled with sequents (or else: formulas).
The notions of Goals(), AX , and closedness of Definition 4.7 are not changed. Note, however, that the V γ ×V δ -validity of AX immediately implies the ∅-strong V γ ×V δ -validity of AX , which (by Lemma 5.8 ) is the logically strongest kind of C-strong R-validity.
Definition 5.14 (Strong Invariant Condition)
The strong invariant condition on (F, C, R, <) is that {Γ } strongly (R, C)-reduces to Goals({t}) for all (Γ, t) ∈ F .
Theorem 5.15 Let the strong proof forest (F, C, R, <) satisfy the above strong invariant condition. Let (Γ, t) ∈ F and t be closed. Now: Γ is C-strongly R-valid and, for any injective
ς ∈ (V δ (Γ ) ∩ dom(C)) → (V γ \V γ (Γ )), Γ ς is ∅-strongly Vγ\ran(ς)¸R -valid and even ∅-strongly R ′ -valid for R ′ := Vγ\ran(ς)¸R ∪ y∈ran(ς) {y} × {ς −1 (y)} < ∪ V γ × dom(C).
Theorem 5.16
The above strong invariant condition is always satisfied when we start with an empty strong proof forest (F, C, R, <) := (∅, ∅, ∅, ∅) and then iterate only the following kinds of modifications of (F, C, R, <) (resulting in (F ′ , C ′ , R ′ , < ′ )):
sequent. Let t be the tree with a single node only, which is labeled with Γ (or else: with a single branch only, such that Γ is the list of the conjugates of the formulas labeling the branch from the leaf to the root). Then we may set
be an extension of (C, R, <). Let (Γ, t) ∈ F . Let l be a leaf in t. Let ∆ be the label of l (or else: result from listing the conjugates of the formulas labeling the branch from l to the root of t). Let G be a finite set of sequents. Now if {∆} strongly
results from t by adding to the former leaf l, exactly for each sequent Λ in G, a new child node labeled with Λ (or else: a new child branch such that Λ is the list of the conjugates of the formulas labeling the branch from the leaf to the new child node of l).
Instantiation: Let σ be a strong existential R-substitution. Let (C ′ , R ′ , < ′ ) be the extended strong σ-update of (C, R, <). Then we may set F ′ := F σ.
While Hypothesizing and Instantiation steps are self-explanatory, Expansion steps are parameterized by a sequent ∆ and a set of sequents G such that {∆} strongly (R ′ , C ′ )-reduces to G for some extension (C ′ , R ′ , < ′ ) of (C, R, <). For the below examples of α-, β-, γ-, and δ-rules we will use the sequent calculi presentation because it is a little more explicit. When we write
we want to denote a sub-rule of the Expansion rule which is given by G := {Π 0 , . . . , Π n−1 },
This means that for this rule really being a sub-rule of the Expansion rule we have to show that C ′ is a (R ′ , < ′ )-choice-condition and that {∆} strongly (R ′ , C ′ )-reduces to G.
Let A and B be formulas, Γ and Π sequents, is not deductively valid (to wit, let Q be the identity relation on a non-trivial universe). γ-step:
Note that the additional variable-condition arises although y γ does not appear in Q(x δ , z). The reason for the additional variable-condition is
The variable-condition (y γ , z δ ) is, however, essential for soundness, because without it we could complete the proof attempt by application of the strong existential {(y
Another interesting point is that now that we have achieved our goal of liberalizing our δ-rule and strictly increasing our proving possibilities, we must not use our original non-liberalized δ-rule of § 4 anymore. This sounds quite strange on the first view, but is simply due to our changed notion of reduction. More precisely, Weak δ-rule:
does not describe a sub-rule of the Expansion rule of the sequent calculus of Theorem 5.16. To see this, let us start with the empty proof tree (∅, ∅, ∅, ∅) and then hypothesize ∀x. x=0, which we abbreviate with Γ . Applying the above weak δ-rule we get x δ =0 as the label of the only leaf in the tree t of the proof tree ((Γ, t), ∅, ∅, ∅). But, while {Γ } does ∅-reduce to {x δ =0} (i.e. Goals({t})), {Γ } does not strongly (∅, ∅)-reduce to {x δ =0}. To see this, consider some Σ-structure A with non-trivial universe, an arbitrary strong existential (A, ∅)-valuation e, and some π ∈ V δ → A with π(x
If we had applied the liberalized δ-rule instead, we would have produced the proof tree ((Γ, t), C, ∅, ∅) with C = {(x δ , x δ =0)}. And, indeed, π is not (e, A)-compatible with C, and {Γ } does strongly (∅, C)-reduce to {x δ =0}.
Note that there is a fundamental difference related to the occurrence of the universal quantification on π between the notion of (weak) reduction This difference in the nature of reduction renders the weak version applicable in areas where the strong version is not. For this reason (and for the sake of stepwise presentation) we have included the weak version in this paper although the strong version will turn out to be superior in all aspects of the calculus of Theorem 5.17 treated in this paper.
This fundamental difference in the nature of reduction cannot be removed: Suppose to weaken the notion of strong reduction in the following definition: G 0 quite-strongly (R, C)-reduces to G 1 in A if for each strong existential (A, R)-valuation e: if G 1 is C-strongly (e, A)-valid, then G 0 is C-strongly (e, A)-valid. At first glance, this version seems to be very nice. One nice aspect is that quite-strong (R, ∅)-reduction is so similar to (weak) R-reduction that we could omit the weak version because it would be very unlikely to find an application of the weak version where the strong version would not be applicable. Another nice aspect is that with quite-strong reduction we could easily adapt our intended version of inductive theorem proving as described in § 1.1, which is not so easy with strong reduction because the induction hypotheses application becomes difficult. But for the (really essential!) monotonicity of reduction as given in Lemma 5.12(5) , quite-strong reduction produces the following two additional requirements:
While the first requirement is unproblematic, the second one restricts the δ-rule even more, which is the opposite of our intention behind the strong version, namely to liberalize the δ-rule.
Moreover, note that (as far as Theorem 5.17 is concerned) the choice-conditions do not have any influence on our proofs and may be discarded. We could, however, use them for the following purposes:
1. We could use the choice-conditions in order to weaken our requirements for our set of axioms AX : Instead of ∅-strong V γ ×V δ -validity of AX the weaker C-strong V γ ×V δ -validity of AX is sufficient for Theorem 5.15.
2. If we add a functional behavior to a choice-condition C, i.e. if we require that for (x δ , A) ∈ C the value for x δ is not just an arbitrary one from the set of values that make A invalid, but a unique element of this set given by some choice-function, then we can use the choiceconditions for simulating the behavior of the δ + + -rule of Beckert &al. (1993) by using the same free δ-variable for the same C-value and by later equating free δ-variables whose C-values become equal during the proof.
3. Moreover, the choice-conditions may be used to get more interesting answers:
Example 5.19
Starting with the empty proof tree and hypothesizing ∀x. Q(x, x), ∃y. ¬Q(y, y) ∧ ¬P(y) , P(z γ )
with the above rules we can produce a proof tree with the leaves
The strong existential ∅-substitution {y
closes the proof tree via an Instantiation step. The answer x δ for our query variable z γ is not very interesting unless we note that the choice-condition tells us to choose x δ in such a way that
The rules of our weak version of § 4 are not only unable to provide any information on free δ-variables, but also unable to prove the hypothesized sequent, because they can only show ∀x. Q(x, x), ∃y. ¬Q(y, y) ∧ ¬P(y) , ∃z. P(z) instead.
Thus it is obvious that the calculus of Theorem 5.17 is not only superior to the calculus of Theorem 4.11 w.r.t. proving but also w.r.t. answer "computation".
Finally, note that (concerning the calculus of Theorem 5.17) the ordering < is not needed at all when in the liberalized δ-steps we always choose a completely new free δ-variable x δ that does not occur elsewhere and when in the Hypothesizing steps we guarantee that ran(R ′′ ) contains only new free δ-variables that have not occurred before. The former is reasonable anyhow, because the free δ-variables introduced by previous liberalized δ-steps cannot be used because they are in dom(C) and the use of a free δ-variable from the input hypothesis deteriorates the result of our proof by giving this free δ-variable an existential meaning (because it puts it into dom(C)) as explained in Theorem 5.15. The latter does not seem to be restrictive for any reasonable application.
All in all, when interested in proving only, the (compared to the weak version) additional choicecondition and ordering of the strong version do not produce any overhead because they can simply be omitted. This is interesting because choice-conditions or Hilbert's ε-expressions are sometimes considered to make proofs quite complicated. When interested in answer "computation", however, they could turn out to be useful. W.r.t. the calculus of Theorem 5.17 we thus may conclude that the strong version is generally better than the weak version and the only overhead seems to be that we have to compute transitive closures when checking whether a substitution σ is really a strong existential R-substitution and when computing the strong σ-update of R. But we actually do not have to compute the transitive closure at all, because the only essential thing is the circularity-check which can be done on a bipartite 9 graph generating the transitive closures. This checking is in the worst case linear in
and is expected to perform at least as well as an optimally integrated version (i.e. one without conversion of term-representation) of the linear unification algorithm of Paterson & Wegman (1978) in the standard framework of Skolemization and unification. Note, however, that the checking for strong existential R-substitutions can also be implemented with any other unification algorithm.
Not really computing the transitive closure enables another refinement that allows us to go even beyond the fascinating strong Skolemization of Nonnengart (1996) . The basic idea of Nonnengart (1996) can be translated into our framework in the following simplified way.
Instead of proving ∀x: (A∨B) it may be advantageous to prove the stronger ∀x: A ∨ ∀x: B, because after applications of α-and liberalized δ-rules to ∀x: A ∨ ∀x: B, resulting in A{x →x Nonnengart (1996) is that the proofs of ∀x: A and ∀x: (A∨B) can be done in parallel without extra costs, such that the bigger variable-condition becomes active only if we decide that the smaller variable-condition is not enough to prove ∀x: A and we had better prove the weaker ∀x: (A∨B).
The disadvantage of the strong Skolemization approach of Nonnengart (1996) , however, is that we have to decide whether to prove either ∀x: A or else ∀x: B in parallel to ∀x: (A∨B). In terms of Hilbert's ε-operator, this asymmetry can be understood from the argumentation of Nonnengart (1996) , which, for some new variable z ∈ V bound and t denoting the term εz: (¬A{x →z} ∧ (A ∨ x=z)), employs the logical equivalence of ∀x: (A∨B) with ∀x: A ∨ ∀x: (B{x →t}) and then the logical equivalence of ∀x: A with ∃x: (A{x →t}). Now, if we do not really compute the transitive closures in our strong version, we can prove A{x →x 
Conclusion
All in all, we have presented an easy to read combination of raising, explicit variable dependency representation, the liberalized δ-rule, and preservation of solutions for first-order deductive theorem proving. Our motivation was not only to make these subjects more popular, but also to provide the foundation for our work on inductive theorem proving (cf. Wirth (1999) ) where the preservation of solutions is indispensable.
To our knowledge 10 we have presented on the one hand the first sound combination of explicit variable dependency representation and the liberalized δ-rule and on the other hand the first framework for preservation of solutions in full first-order logic.
Finally, the described problems with the development of the strong version reveal unexpected details on the nature of the liberalized δ-rule, and the discussion at the end of § 5 opens up several new research directions.
The Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3.6 
where π ∈ V δ → A is an arbitrary extension of π ′ . For this definition to be okay, we have to prove the following claims: Claim 1: For y ∈ V δ (σ(x)), the choice of π ⊇ π ′ does not influence the value of π(y). Claim 2: For x ′ ∈ V γ (σ(x)), the choice of π ⊇ π ′ does not influence the value of ǫ(e ′ )(π)(x ′ ). Claim 3: For the weak version we have to show that S e R is irreflexive. Claim 4: For the strong version we have to show that (S e R)
+ is a wellfounded ordering. Proof of Claim 1: y ∈ V δ (σ(x)) means (y, x) ∈ U σ . By definition of S e we have (y, x) ∈ S e , i.e. y ∈ S e {x} = dom(π ′ ).
Q.e.d. (Claim 2) Proof of Claim 3: Since S e R = S e ′ E σ R ∪ U σ R and U σ R is irreflexive (as σ is an existential R-substitution), it suffices to show irreflexivity of S e ′ E σ R. Since R ′ is the σ-update of R, this is equal to S e ′ R ′ , which is irreflexive because e ′ is an existential (A, R ′ )-valuation. Q.e.d. (Claim 3) Proof of Claim 4: Since σ is a strong existential R-substitution, (U σ R) + is a wellfounded ordering. Thus, if (S e R)
is not a wellfounded ordering, there must be an infinite descending sequence of the form
, which contradicts the wellfoundedness of
where the latter step is due to R ′ being the strong σ-update of R. The latter relation is a wellfounded ordering, however, because e ′ is a strong existential (A, R ′ )-valuation.
Q.e.d. (Claim 4)
Now, for π ∈ V δ → A and x ∈ V γ we have ǫ(e)(π)(x) = e(x)( Se {x} ¸π) = eval(A ⊎ ǫ(e ′ )(π) ⊎ π)(σ(x)) i.e.
ǫ(e)(π) = σ • eval(A ⊎ ǫ(e ′ )(π) ⊎ π).
Q.e.d. (Lemma 3.6) Proof of Lemma 4.2
This a trivial consequence of Lemma 3.6(1) .
Q.e.d. (Lemma 4.2) Proof of Theorem 4.11
Let A be an arbitrary Σ-structure (Σ-algebra). We only prove the first example of each kind of rule to be a sub-rule of the Expansion rule and leave the rest as an exercise.
α-rule:
We have to show that {Γ (A∨B) Π} ∅-reduces to {A B Γ Π} in A. This is trivial, however, because (e, A)-validity of the two sets is logically equivalent for each existential (A, ∅)-valuation e.
β-rule: We have to show that {Γ (A∧B) Π} ∅-reduces to {A Γ Π, B Γ Π} in A. This is trivial, however, because (e, A)-validity of the two sets is logically equivalent for each existential (A, ∅)-valuation e.
γ-rule: We have to show that {Γ ∃x: A Π} ∅-reduces to {A{x →x γ } Γ ∃x: A Π} in A. This is the case, however, because (e, A)-validity of the two sets is logically equivalent for each existential (A, ∅)-valuation e. The direction from left to right is given because the former sequent is a sub-sequent of the latter. The other direction, which is the only one we actually have to show here, is also clear because (π, e, A)-validity of A{x →x γ } implies (π, e, A)-validity of ∃x: A. Although this is clear, we should be a little more explicit here because the standard semantic definition of ∃ (cf. e.g. Wirth (1997) , p. 188) does not use free γ-variables and is somewhat more complicated than it could be in terms of free γ-variables. Moreover, in the note above the theorem we remarked that the restriction on x γ not occurring in the former sequent is not really necessary. Thus, in order to be more explicit here, assume that the latter sequent is (e, A)-valid for some existential (A, ∅)-valuation e. Let π ∈ V δ → A. We have to show that the former sequent is Since y δ does not occur in A, this formula is equal to ∃x:A, which means that the former sequent is (π, e, A)-valid as was to be shown.
δ-rule:
We have to show that {Γ ∀x: A Π} R ′′ -reduces to {A{x →x
Assume that the latter sequent is (e, A)-valid for some existential R ′′ -valuation e. Let π ∈ V δ → A. We have to show that the former sequent is (π, e, A)-valid. If some formula in Γ Π is (π, e, A)-valid, then the former sequent is (π, e, A)-valid, too. Otherwise, Γ Π is not only invalid in A ⊎ ǫ(e)(π) ⊎ π, but also in
Since the latter sequent is assumed to be (e, A)-valid, this means that A{x →x
By the standard semantic definition of ∀ (cf. e.g. Wirth (1997) , p. 188) and since quantification on x cannot occur in A (as ∀x: A is a formula in our restricted sense, cf. § 1.4), this means that ∀x:(A{x →x δ }{x δ →x}) is valid in A ⊎ǫ(e)(π) ⊎π. Since x δ does not occur in A, this formula is equal to ∀x:A, which means that the former sequent is (π, e, A)-valid as was to be shown.
Q.e.d. (Theorem 4.11)
Since in Doornbos &al. (1997) Theorem 62 and especially its proof (which is used to illustrate the application of the very special framework of that paper) are not easy to read, we give an easier proof here that requires fewer set theoretical preconditions and uses induction only on ω. It proceeds by showing the existence of a refutational element in a nonempty set of infinite descending sequences.
Otherwise we can choose s ∈ C and families (D i ) i∈N and (E i ) i∈N+ of subsets of F inductively in the following way:
If E n is nonempty we choose s n from E n . Otherwise, we choose s n to be B-irreducible in D n .
Since s ∈ C and A is terminating, there is some minimal n ∈ N with s n B s n+1 . We have n ≻ 0, because otherwise s 0 B s 1 ∈ D 0 contradicts the choice of s 0 . Thus, s n−1 (A\B) s n B s n+1 . Since s n−1 (A\B) s n , we know that s n was chosen not from
* we get two possible cases now.
Then there are some m ∈ N and some s 0 . . . s n−1 u 0 . . . u m s n+2 s n+3 . . . in C with s n−1 B u 0 and u m = s n+1 . Thus, u 0 ∈ E n , i.e. E n is not empty. But this contradicts the fact that s n was not chosen from E n . Q.e.d. (Lemma 5.4) Proof of Lemma 5.5
Here we denote concatenation (product) of relations '•' simply by juxtaposition and assume it to have higher priority than any other binary operator.
Claim 2: < ′ is a wellfounded ordering on V δ . Proof of Claim 2: Since C is a (R, <)-choice-condition, we know that < is a wellfounded ordering on V δ and R< ⊆ R.
Since σ is a strong existential R-substitution, we know that (U σ R) + is a is a wellfounded ordering on V δ . By Lemma 5.4 (setting A := < −1 and B := (U σ R) −1 ) by the first of the above containments, we know that
′ is terminating, too. Finally < ′ is also transitive, since by the above containments: 
Let e be the strong existential (A, R)-valuation with ǫ(e) = ǫ(e ′ ) given by Lemma 3.6(1) due to R⊆R ′ . Let π be (e, A)-compatible with C. It suffices to show that G is (π, e, A)-valid. Since the notion of (e, A)-compatibility does not depend on the precise form of e besides ǫ(e), we know that π is also (e ′ , A)-compatible with C. Due to (1): Since C is a (R, <)-choice-condition, we know that < is a wellfounded ordering on V δ and R ⊆ V γ ×V δ . Moreover, we have S e ⊆ V δ ×V γ and V γ ∩V δ = ∅. Thus, if ⊳ is not wellfounded, then there is an infinitely descending sequence of the form y 2i+2 S e y 2i+1 (R • ≤) y 2i for all i ∈ N. Since C is a (R, <)-choice-condition, we know that (R • <) ⊆ R. Thus, we get y 2i+2 S e y 2i+1 R y 2i for all i ∈ N. This means that (S e •R) + is not wellfounded, which contradicts the assumption that e is a strong existential (A, R)-valuation.
(2): Let π ∈ (V δ \dom(C)) → A. By noetherian induction on ⊳ and with the help of a choice function we can define some ̺ ∈ V free → A in the following way: For x ∈ V γ : ̺(x) := e(x)( Se {x} ¸̺). For x ∈ V δ \dom(C): ̺(x) := π(x). For x ∈ dom(C): ̺(x) := a, where a is an element of the universe of A such that, if possible, C(x) is not ( V δ¸̺ , e, A)-valid. For this definition to be okay, we have to show, for each x ∈ V free , that ̺(x) is defined in terms of ⊳ {x} ¸̺. In case of x ∈ V γ , this is obvious because S e ⊆⊳. In case of x ∈ V δ \dom(C), this is trivial. Thus, let x ∈ dom(C). Since C is a (R, <)-choice-condition, we have z δ < x for all z δ ∈ V δ (C(x))\{x} and u γ R x for all u γ ∈ V γ (C(x)). Thus, since R⊆⊳, by induction hypothesis, ( V δ¸̺ , e, A)-validity of C(x) means validity of C(x) in A⊎̺. Moreover, since <⊆⊳, we know that ̺(x) is defined in terms of V free (C(x))\{x}¸̺ ⊆ ⊳ {x} ¸̺. Finally, we define ξ π := dom(C)¸̺ .
For showing that π⊎ξ π is (e, A)-compatible with C, let y δ ∈ dom(C) and suppose that C(y (3a): Let ξ be given as in (2). Define e ′ via e ′ (x)(τ ) := ξ π (ς −1 (x)) (x ∈ ran(ς), τ ∈ ((V δ \dom(C)) ∩ ⊳ {ς −1 (x)} ) → A, where π ∈ (V δ \dom(C)) → A an arbitrary extension of τ ) and e ′ (x)(τ ) := e(x)( Se {x} ¸(π⊎ξ π )) (x ∈ V γ \ran(ς), τ ∈ ((V δ \dom(C)) ∩ ⊳ {x} ) → A, where π ∈ (V δ \dom(C)) → A an arbitrary extension of τ ). Note that this definition is okay because the choice of π does not matter: For the first π this is directly given by (2). For the second π we have: Se {x} ¸π ⊆ ⊳ {x} ¸π ⊆ τ, and, for y ∈ dom(C) ∩ S e {x} , by (2), ξ π (y) is already determined by ⊳ {y} ¸π ⊆ ⊳ {x} ¸π ⊆ τ.
Then {y} × {ς −1 (y)} ∪ V γ ×dom(C), we get
+ is a wellfounded ordering because ⊳ is wellfounded by (1) . This means that e ′ is a strong existential (A, R ′ )-valuation. It now suffices to show that Gς is (τ, e ′ , A)-valid for all τ ∈ V δ → A. Set π := V δ \dom(C)¸τ . We get the following equalities for the below reasons: eval(A ⊎ ǫ(e ′ )(τ ) ⊎ τ )(Gς) = eval(A ⊎ (( Vγ¸i d ⊎ V δ \dom(ς)¸i d ⊎ ς) • eval(A ⊎ ǫ(e ′ )(τ ) ⊎ τ )))(G) = eval(A ⊎ ǫ(e ′ )(τ ) ⊎ V δ \dom(ς)¸τ ⊎ (ς•(ǫ(e ′ )(τ ))))(G) = eval(A ⊎ ǫ(e)(π ⊎ ξ π ) ⊎ V δ \dom(ς)¸τ ⊎ dom(ς)¸ξπ )(G) = eval(A ⊎ ǫ(e)(π ⊎ ξ π ) ⊎ π ⊎ ξ π )(G) = TRUE First: By the Substitution-Lemma. Second: By distributing • over ∪. Third: Since, for x ∈ V γ (G) we have x ∈ V γ \ran(ς) and thus ǫ(e ′ )(τ )(x) = ǫ(e)(π ⊎ ξ π )(x). Moreover, since, for x ∈ dom(ς), ǫ(e ′ )(τ )(ς(x)) = ξ π (ς −1 (ς(x))) = ξ π (x), we get ς • (ǫ(e ′ )(τ )) = dom(ς)¸ξπ . Fourth: By noting that dom(ς) = V δ (G) ∩ dom(C). Fifth: Because π⊎ξ π is (e, A)-compatible with C (by (2)) and G is C-strongly (e, A)-valid.
γ-rule:
We have to show that {Γ ∃x:A Π} strongly (R, C)-reduces to {A{x →x γ } Γ ∃x:A Π} in A. This is the case, however, because (π, e, A)-validity of the two sets is logically equivalent for each strong existential (A, R)-valuation e and π ∈ V δ → A. The direction from left to right is given because the former sequent is a sub-sequent of the latter. The other direction, which is the only one we actually have to show here, is also clear because (π, e, A)-validity of A{x →x γ } implies (π, e, A)-validity of ∃x: A. Although this is clear, we should be a little more explicit here because the standard semantic definition of ∃ (cf. e.g. Wirth (1997) , p. 188) does not use free γ-variables and is somewhat more complicated than it could be in terms of free γ-variables. Moreover, in the note above the theorem we remarked that the restriction on x γ not occurring in the former sequent is not really necessary. Thus, in order to be more explicit here, assume that the latter sequent is (π, e, A)-valid for some strong existential (A, R)-valuation e and some π that is (e, A)-compatible with C. We have to show that the former sequent is (π, e, A)-valid. If this is not the case, A{x →x γ } must be (π, e, A)-valid. Let y δ ∈ V δ \V δ (A). Then, since A{x →y . By the standard semantic definition of ∃ and since quantification on x cannot occur in A (as ∃x: A is a formula in our restricted sense, cf. § 1.4), this means that ∃x:(A{x →y δ }{y δ →x}) is valid in A ⊎ ǫ(e)(π) ⊎ π. Since y δ does not occur in A, this formula is equal to ∃x:A, which means that the former sequent is (π, e, A)-valid as was to be shown. δ-rule: Firstly, we have to show that C ′ is a (R ′ , < ′ )-choice-condition. Since x δ / ∈ V δ (A)∪dom(<) and < is a wellfounded ordering, < ′ := < ∪ ≤ V δ (A) × {x δ } is a wellfounded ordering with x δ / ∈ dom(< ′ ), too. Therefore, R ′′ • < ′ = ∅, and then
where the inclusion is due to the following: first, we have R • < ⊆ R because C is a (R, <)-choice-condition; second, in case of z 0 R z 1 < ′′ z 2 we have z 2 = x δ and there is some z ′ ∈ V δ (A) with z 1 ≤ z ′ ; then, again by R • < ⊆ R, we get z 0 R z
} , the remaining requirements for C ′ to be a (R ′ , < ′ )-choice-condition are easily checked.
Secondly, we have to show that {Γ ∀x:A Π} strongly (R ′ , C ′ )-reduces to {A{x →x δ } Γ Π} in A. Assume that the latter sequent is (π, e, A)-valid for some strong existential R ′ -valuation e and some π that is (e, A)-compatible with C ′ . We have to show that the former sequent is (π, e, A)-valid. If some formula in Γ Π is (π, e, A)-valid, then the former sequent is (π, e, A)-valid, too. Otherwise, this means that A{x →x ′ , we know that A{x →x δ } is even valid in A ⊎ ǫ(e)(π) ⊎π ′ for all π ′ ∈ V δ → A with V δ \{x δ }¸π ′ = V δ \{x δ }¸π . By the standard semantic definition of ∀ (cf. e.g. Wirth (1997) , p. 188) and since quantification on x cannot occur in A (as ∀x:A is a formula in our restricted sense, cf. § 1.4), this means that ∀x:(A{x →x δ }{x δ →x}) is valid in A ⊎ ǫ(e)(π) ⊎ π. Since x δ does not occur in A, this formula is equal to ∀x:A, which means that the former sequent is (π, e, A)-valid as was to be shown.
Q.e.d. (Theorem 5.17)

